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Biogen v Medeva (1996) 
LUKE McDONAGH   
 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The decision in Biogen v Medeva1 was handed down by the House of Lords on the night of 
Halloween 1996, more than 20 years ago.2 The case is a landmark one because it was the first 
time the House of Lords considered genetic engineering in the context of patent law. Every 
student of UK patent law still studies the case, often in great detail. Consequently, in exams it is 
not uncommon for students to be asked to discuss the legacy of Lord Hoffmann's statement on 
'Biogen insufficiency' in the context of earlier cases like Genentech (1989) and later cases such as 
Generics v Lundbeck (2009).3 Ambitious students take their time in writing their essays, trying to 
                                                          
1
  Biogen Inc v Medeva  plc [1997] RPC 1, [1996] UKHL 18, (1997) 38 BMLR 149, on appeal from the 
Court of Appeal - Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc [1995] FSR 4; [1995] RPC 25, and the Patents Court - Biogen Inc v 
Medeva Plc (Unreported, November 4, 1993). See also Patents Act 1977 1(1), 3, 5(2)(a), 14(3) & (5), & 72(1) 
and the Text of the European Patent Convention, of 5 October 1973, as revised by the Act revising Article 63 
EPC of 17 December 1991, and the Act revising the EPC of 29 November 2000, available at 
https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/ma1.html. The House of Lords judicial panel was 
made up of Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Mustill, Lord Slynn of Hadley and Lord 
Hoffmann. 
2
  The Committee of the House of Lords heard the case on 29 and 30 April and on 1, 2, 7, 9, 13, 14, 15, 
16, 20, 21, 22 and 23 May 1996. 
3
  Genentech Inc.'s Patent [1989] RPC 147, 272. H Lundbeck A/S v Generics (UK) Ltd. [2008] EWCA 
Civ 311, [2008] RPC 19 as affirmed by the House of Lords in [2009] UKHL 12, [2009] 2 All ER 955. See also 
D. Brennan, 'Biogen Sufficiency Reconsidered,' Intellectual Property Quarterly 4 (2009), 476; J Pila, ‘Chemical 
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craft an argument as sly as Lord Hoffmann's brilliant judgment. For the intellectual property 
scholar, reading the case again is undoubtedly a nostalgic experience. Moreover, despite later 
rulings that have narrowed the scope of its effect, the judgment should still be viewed as a 
seminal one in UK patent law.4 It still has things to teach us, even after all this time, not least 
about how dissimilar the areas of law and science are from a methodological point of view, with 
each field possessing its own rational processes and own standards of acceptable proof.5 On this, 
one can say that Biogen v Medeva provides firm evidence – to scholars of science and law alike - 
that it is precisely this dissonance that makes patent law both a fascinating area and a hugely 
challenging one. 
 
In this regard, over the course of this chapter I will first assess the reasoning behind the 
judgments at the High Court, the Court of Appeal, and finally, the House of Lords, exploring 
each ruling in detail. Following that I will consider what makes the case a landmark today from 
the perspective of its judicial legacy, also taking into account the views of the case participants 
twenty years on. 
 
 
To understand the whole story of the litigation - from the Patents Court to the House of Lords, 
as well as the European Patent Office (EPO) opposition hearings, one must first go back to 
1978, when four molecular biologists met in Geneva to make what would prove to be a prescient 
decision: to found a new company - Biogen Inc. - in order to commercialise their ongoing 
research in the then-new and blossoming field of biotechnology.6 The four scientists were: 
Walter Gilbert (a US citizen and Harvard University Professor), Kenneth Murray (a British 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Products and Proportionate Patents Before and After Generics v Lundbeck,’ King’s Law Journal 20 (2009), 489 
and C. Helmers and L. McDonagh, ‘Patent litigation in the UK: an empirical survey 2000-2008,’ JIPLP 8 
(2013), 846. 
4
  The case is heavily featured in the latest edition of the leading practitioner textbook on patents - The 
Hon Mr Justice Colin Birss, Andrew Waugh, QC, Tom Mitcheson, QC, Douglas Campbell, QC, Justin Turner, 
QC, Tom Hinchliffe, QC, Terrell on the Law of Patents (18th edition: London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2017), 
including at Chapter 2, section 2: ‘What is an Invention?’ and Chapter 13, section 3: ‘Biogen Insufficiency’ (last 
accessed via Westlaw, 13 December 2016). 
5
  A. Pottage and B. Sherman, Figures of Invention: A History of Modern Patent Law (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 1-29. 
6  ‘Harvard keeps its hands clean’ New Scientist, 20 November 1980, 497; ‘Harvard, Biogen in Patent 
Deal’ The New York Times, 29 November 1983; S. Yanchiski, ‘Chemical Giants Turn to Biotechnology’ New 
Scientist, 6 November 1980, 349. 
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citizen and Professor at the University of Edinburgh, who later became Professor Sir Kenneth 
Murray), Phillip Allen Sharp (a US citizen and Professor at MIT), and Charles Weissmann (a 
Hungarian-born Swiss citizen and Professor at the University of Zurich).7 All were undoubtedly 
world-leading experts, and two of them, Gilbert and Sharp, later became Nobel Laureates, with 
Gilbert receiving the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, and Sharp receiving the Nobel 
Prize in Chemistry.8  
 
Biogen was the first Europe-based Biotechnology firm – albeit one with close links with Harvard 
University - and the company went on to become one of the world's largest and most important 
biotech companies. In fact, Biogen Inc. continues to thrive commercially today: in 2015 its 
revenues amounted to more than $ 10 billion.9 For the purposes of this chapter, what is 
particularly significant is that Biogen was one of the first companies to use genetic engineering to 
develop pharmaceutical products – a business model heavily reliant on patent law. 
 
Although Prof. Kenneth Murray, unlike two of his business partners, was never honoured by the 
Nobel Committee, he was a remarkable and innovative researcher in the field of DNA 
recombination; indeed, he was held in such high regard at the Department of Molecular Biology 
at the University of Edinburgh that on his passing in 2013 the event was marked by obituaries in 
several UK national newspapers, including The Guardian and The Times.10 One seminal 
achievement derived from his experimental work in the late 1970s was the successful isolation of 
part of the genome of the virus Hepatitis B - the Dane particle – and the splicing of it into the 
                                                          
7
  See, generally, P. Goujon, From Biotechnology to Genomes: The Meaning of the Double Helix (London, 
World Scientific Publishing, 2001) 225; ‘Harvard wins key Biotech Patent’ New Scientist, 8 December 
1983, 741. See also A.D. Chandler, Shaping the Industrial Century: The Remarkable Story of the Evolution 
of the Modern Chemical and Pharmaceutical Companies (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2005), 275-
276. 
8  See S. Müller-Wille, H-Jörg Rheinberger, A Cultural History of Heredity (The University of Chicago 
Press, 2012), 190. 
9
 Biogen Inc.’s annual revenue can be seen in its 2015 10-K submission to the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission - https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/875045/000087504516000042/biib-20151231x10k.htm 
- See also J. Silverlight, ‘Cashing on DNA’ The Guardian, 10 Feb 1980, 34. 
10  T. Dalyell ‘Obituary: Professor Sir Kenneth Murray, the scientist who developed the vaccine against 
Hepatitis B’ The Independent, 15 April 2013; D. Finnegan, ‘Obituary: Sir Kenneth Murray’ The Guardian, 21 
April 2013; ‘Obituary: Professor Sir Kenneth Murray; Molecular biologist who helped to create a life-saving 
machine’ The Times, 26 April 2013; W.J. Brammar and W.B. Gratzer ‘Sir Kenneth Murray: 30 December 1930- 
7 April 2013’ Biogr. Mems Fell. R. Soc. 60 (2014), 331-348. 
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DNA of a host cell.11 When the host cell replicated, the part of the Hepatitis B genome encoded 
for in the spliced-in DNA was expressed. This expression was a Hepatitis B antigen capable of 
triggering the production of Hepatitis B antibodies in the immune system. What Prof. Murray's 
experiments produced, therefore, was the basis for a useful - and lucrative - Hepatitis B 
vaccine.12 
 
The result of this experimentation led to the filing of a patent application by the newly formed 
Biogen Inc. on 22 December 1978 in the UK (the Biogen 1 application). On 21 December 1979 
Biogen made a filing at the EPO - claiming the earlier priority date - for a patent (the Biogen 
patent) for a claimed invention comprising: 
 
‘A recombinant DNA molecule characterized by a DNA sequence coding for a polypeptide or a 
fragment thereof displaying HBV antigen specificity, said DNA sequence being operatively 
linked to an expression control sequence in the recombinant DNA molecule and being 
expressed to produce a polypeptide displaying HBV antigen specificity when a suitable host cell 
transformed with said recombinant DNA molecule is cultured, the transformed host cell not 
producing any human serum proteins and any primate serum proteins other than the polypeptide 
displaying HBV antigen specificity.’13. 
 
Claim 1 of the Biogen patent thus concerned a product defined 'partly by the way it had been 
made ("recombinant DNA") and partly by what it did (the words followed by "characterised 
by")'.14 Meanwhile, Claims 2 to 7 described specific embodiments of the recombinant DNA 
molecule according to Claim 1. 
 
After a lengthy examination procedure, the patent was granted by the EPO in 1990 as European 
patent No. 0 182 442.15 Oppositions to the patent were filed at the EPO shortly thereafter. The 
                                                          
11  D. Brennan, 'Biogen Sufficiency Reconsidered,' Intellectual Property Quarterly 4 (2009), 476, 476-
479. 
12  C. Marwick, ‘Genetic engineers in the sin-bin…and making vaccine against hepatitis’ New Scientist, 
11 September 1980, 764; M. Walters, ‘Prof. Murray's Biogen mint’ The Daily Mail, 22 February 1983, 29. See 
also J. Watts and T. Alkin, ‘A Road to Unification: Patent Litigation in the United Kingdom 1990-2012,’ 
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J . 23 (2013), 571, 581. 
13
  BIOGEN/Hepatitis B [1995] EPOR 1. 
14
  European Patent specification available at https://register.epo.org/application?number=EP85201908. 
15
  Ibid. 
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Opposition Division of the EPO revoked the patent on 21 January 1993.16 On appeal, the EPO 
Board of Appeals overturned that decision on 28 July 1994, which meant that the patent 
remained valid.17 Of course, due to the fragmentary nature of enforcement within the European 
Patent Convention system, national litigation could still proceed over the same patent on the 
issues of infringement and validity. Furthermore, while the UK's courts must take the EPO's 
validity decisions into account, there nonetheless tends to be some leeway for divergent judicial 
decisions at the EPO and national levels.18 This kind of divergence did indeed occur in Biogen v 
Medeva.19 
 
 
B.    OBSERVING THE CASE THROUGH THE COURTS 
 
(1)  At the Patents Court  
 
UK national litigation over the patent was initiated in July 1992 when Biogen Inc. filed a patent 
infringement case against Medeva plc at the Patents Court - part of the High Court of England 
and Wales - in London.20 The rationale behind the case being filed was that a pharmaceutical 
group called Medeva planned to market a third-generation hepatitis B vaccine manufactured via 
recombinant DNA technology.21 Biogen argued that this was an infringement of the patent 
granted to them by the EPO in 1990 (EP 0 182 442), as well as another of their European 
                                                          
16
  See Text of the European Patent Convention, of 5 October 1973, as revised by the Act revising Article 
63 EPC of 17 December 1991, and the Act revising the EPC of 29 November 2000, available at 
https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/ma1.html 
17
  https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t930296ex1.html 
18
  L. McDonagh, European Patent Litigation in the Shadow of the Unified Patent Court (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2016), 1-11. 
19
  Y. Cripps ‘Recombinant DNA Technology. A Patent Case in the House of Lords’ The Cambridge Law 
Journal, 56 (1997), 262-267 and J. Straus, ‘Patent Litigation in Europe—A Glimmer of Hope? Present 
Status and Future Perspectives,’ Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y 2 (2000), 403, 407. 
20
  Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc (Unreported, November 4, 1993). See also Chiron Corp. v Organon Teknika 
Ltd. (No. 3) [1994] FSR 202. The Patents Court was created in 1980 by section 96 of the Patents Act 1977 
(subsequently repealed and replaced by section 60 of the Senior Courts Act 1981). For a comment, see J. 
Rimmer ‘The UK patents court decisions in Chrion and Biogen: a review of the issues’ Patent World, March 
1994, 22-28; see also I. Judge, S. Cooke, M. Burdon, T. Powell, P. Gilbert and C. Hore, 'Chiron v Organon 
and Biogen v Medeva: A Boost for the Biotech Industry' Patent World, December/January 1994, 20-26. 
21  ‘Medeva's fate could hinge on patent case’ The Times, 30 September 1993, 30 and G. Counsell, ‘Medeva 
faces court action over patent’ The Independent, 25 August 1993, 40. 
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patents (EP 0 013 828) though infringement proceedings over this other patent were not 
pursued through to trial.22 Medeva made a counter-claim for revocation. 
Interestingly, Biogen had licensed EP 0182 442 - the Biogen patent - to Smith Kline Beecham 
and Merck, both of whom went on to market successful vaccines based on the patent;23 and early 
on during the proceedings Medeva attempted (unsuccessfully) to join Smith Kline Beecham as a 
defendant to their revocation counter-claim.24 What is crucial for our purposes is analysis of the 
precise grounds of Medeva’s counter-claim for revocation of the Biogen patent.25 The 
fundamental ones can be summarised as follows: 
 
(i) that the claimed invention was obvious in accordance with sections l(l)(b) and 3 of the 
Patents Act 1977, both at the date of application for the Biogen patent filed in December 
1979 and at the claimed priority date of the Biogen 1 application in December 1978. (During 
the trial Biogen conceded that the claimed invention was obvious at the date when the 
application for the European patent was filed but argued that it was not obvious on the 
claimed priority date of the earlier Biogen 1 application.) 
 
(ii) that Biogen was not entitled to avail of the priority date of the 1978 Biogen 1 application 
because - in accordance with section 5(2)(a) of the Patents Act 1977 - it did not support the 
invention claimed in the Biogen patent as filed in 1979.  
 
(iii) that the claimed invention was not an invention in line with section 1(1) Patents Act 1977 
 
(iv) that the description in the specification was insufficient under section 72(l)(c) of the Patents 
Act 1977.  
 
                                                          
22  ‘Refusal to stop infringement’ The Times, 1 December 1993, 34. 
23  C. Huhne, ‘Patent Challenge’ The Independent, 4 October 1993, 22 and G. Counsell ‘Medeva faces suit 
over new vaccine’ The Independent 28 October 1993, 41. 
24
  L. Jacobs, ‘Case Comment: Patents’ E.I.P.R. 15 (1993), D89. 
25
  See generally, R.S. Crespi,  'Patenting in Biotechnology—the saga continues,' Biotechnology and 
Genetic Engineering Reviews 15 (1989)., 229. 9; H. Kelly, ‘Biogen’s Hepatitis B Patent Held Valid and 
Infringed’ E.I.P.R. 2 (1993), 75. 
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During a lengthy trial at the Patents Court Aldous J. heard expert evidence about what people 
skilled in the art of recombinant DNA technology would have thought and done at the time.26 
One of the interesting points that came out during expert testimony was that during the period 
immediately prior to Prof. Murray’s 1978 discovery a voluntary moratorium had been in effect 
on further genetic engineering work by scientists due to concerns about the safety of genetically 
modified bacteria – which meant that while scientists continued to develop ideas in the abstract, 
practical research had halted, leaving the methods available to reach desired end-points and goals 
undeveloped.27 This was relevant to the court's analysis of inventive step, because Aldous J. had 
to decide whether, in light of prior-existing research, the patent ought to be considered obvious 
at the claimed priority date of 1978.  
 
Nonetheless, the first thing Aldous J. had to consider was whether claim 1 of the Biogen patent 
referred to more than one invention. This was important to the insufficiency and obviousness 
questions because if the patent contained more than one invention - e.g. two - the claims would 
have to sufficiently disclose each invention; and moreover, each of the inventions would have to 
be considered in turn with regard to the priority date.28 To the relief of Biogen, Aldous J. ruled 
that there was only one invention in claim 1 of the Biogen patent. Given this finding, and in light 
of the evidence presented to him, he further concluded that the requirement of sufficiency was 
satisfied.29 
 
With respect to obviousness, Aldous J. followed the earlier rulings in Asahi30 on assessment of 
the priority date.31 He further voiced support for the idea that a patent application which outlines 
a new principle, as well as a method by which it may be carried out, can provide support for a 
claim to that principle, however carried out.32 Along these lines, Aldous J. decided that the 
                                                          
26  Biogen relied on the testimony of Professor Sir Kenneth Murray, Professor Burrell, Professor Villa-
Komaroff and Dr. Alan Kingsman. Medeva called Professor Jeffrey Almond, Dr. Cozens and Mr. Ronald 
Holmes as witnesses. 
27
  ‘From hepatitis B virus antigens to wine and canapés: Biogen v Medeva revisited’ PatLit Blog 11 
February 2015 - http://patlit.blogspot.co.uk/2015/02/from-hepatitis-b-virus-antigens-to-wine.html 
28
  Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc [1995] RPC 25, 42-43. 
29  Ibid., 44-50. 
30  Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK's Application [1991] RPC 485. 
31  Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc [1995] RPC 25, 52-56. 
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principal claims - 1-4 - of the Biogen patent were supported, and thus entitled to the earlier 
priority date (the Biogen 1 application), although claims 5-6 were not.  
 
In analysing the substantive test for obviousness Aldous J. referred to the classic case of 
Windsurfing International Inc v. Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd33 on the four step approach: 
 
‘The first is to identify the inventive concept embodied in the patent in suit. Thereafter, the court 
has to assume the mantle of the normally skilled but unimaginative addressee in the art at the 
priority date and impute to him what was, at that date, common general knowledge in the art in 
question. The third step is to identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter cited as 
being "known or used" and the alleged invention. Finally, the court has to ask itself whether, 
viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention, those differences constitute steps which 
would have been obvious to the skilled man or whether they require any degree of invention.’34 
 
In line with this, Aldous J. first identified the Prof. Murray's inventive concept as 'the idea or 
decision to express a polypeptide displaying HBV antigen specificity in a suitable host'35 i.e.  
making HBV antigens by recombinant DNA technology. He then examined what would have 
been known to the person skilled in the art. Crucial to this assessment (of obviousness) was the 
'Villa-Komaroff paper' - a leading scientific publication on DNA recombination in the period 
prior to Prof. Murray's application, and thus an element contributing to the state of the art.36 
 
Aldous J., in considering the importance of the Villa-Komaroff paper, remarked: 
 
’It is accepted that once a decision [had] been made to try expression of the HBV genome, the 
technique set out in Villa-Komaroff would have been sufficient to enable it to be carried out. 
Thus the difference between the prior art and the inventive concept is the idea or decision to 
express a polypeptide displaying HBV antigen specificity in a suitable host.’37 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
32  Ibid., 56. 
33
  Windsurfing International Inc v. Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd [1985] RPC 59. 
34
  Ibid., 73-74. 
35
  Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc [1995] RPC 25, 57. 
36
  L. Villa-Komaroff et al., 'A bacterial clone synthesizing proinsulin,' Proc. Nati. Acad. Sci. USA 75 
(1978), 3727. 
37
  Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc [1995] RPC 25, 58. 
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Aldous J. then examined what strategies would have been available to the skilled person in 1978 
who sought to make HBV antigens via recombinant DNA technology.38 He considered that 
there were two significant possible methods.39 One would have been to try to find out more 
about HBV and its DNA through gene sequencing, which would provide some useful 
information regarding the expression of the relevant genes.40 The alternative strategy would have 
been to take the genomic DNA and try to express it in E. coli. This is what Prof. Murray had 
done in the late 1970s. Biogen's argument on this point was that it was not until the sequence 
had been obtained, with the knowledge that introns - nucleotide sequences within a gene that are 
removed by RNA splicing - would not be a problem 'that the skilled man would seriously 
consider expression of HBV antigens'.41 Aldous J. agreed and held that the strategy taken by 
Prof. Murray would not have been obvious in 1978: 
 
’In the present case, there is no evidence to suggest that anyone, other than Biogen, 
contemplated expression of the HBV antigen in December 1978, despite the fact that the skilled 
man must have read the Villa-Komaroff paper and there was an incentive to do so. The reason 
may well be that stated in the patent, namely the skilled man was put off by introns.’42 
 
Finally, Aldous J. also rejected the idea that the patent did not describe an 'invention' in line with 
the earlier case of Genentech.43  
 
Thus, the Patents Court ruled in favour of Biogen Inc., holding that the principal claims of the 
patent were valid and the patent had been infringed.44 Precisely because this decision was seen as 
                                                          
38  Ibid., 56-65. 
39  Ibid., 59. 
40  Ibid., 59-60. 
41
  Ibid., 64. 
42
  Ibid., 65. Aldous J. also rejected Medeva's argument that the first strategy - gene sequencing - was an 
obvious way of making the antigens. See J. Thomson ‘The Grey Penumbra of Interpretation Surrounding the 
Obviousness Test for Biotech Patents’ E.I.P.R. 2 (1996), 90. 
43
  Genentech Inc.'s Patent [1989] RPC 147, 272. 
44  L. Buckingham ‘Medeva suffers vaccine pain’ The Guardian, 5 Nov 1993, 17; G. Foster, ‘Medeva 
shakes dealers’ The Daily Mail 5 November 1993, 71; R. Hotten, ‘Medeva loses patent battle’ The 
Independent, 5 November 1993, 34.  
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highly favourable to the patentee and the defendant - Medeva - suffered a significant  financial 
blow, the case was sent to the appeal court.45  
 
(2) At the Court of Appeal  
 
The Court of Appeal - comprised of Nourse L.J., Gibson L.J and Hobhouse L.J. - unanimously 
reversed the ruling of Aldous J., finding the patent invalid.46 In contrast with the High Court, this 
court was assisted by scientific expert advisers.47 Hobhouse L.J. delivered the judgment of the 
court. and  began his judgment by saying that he did not believe that the court was differing 
from Aldous J. on any question of the acceptance of the evidence of witnesses or primary 
scientific fact.48 The court nevertheless undertook a thorough re-examination of the evidence on 
the question of whether the method disclosed in Biogen 1 had fully enabled the making of the 
invention (HBsAg).49 The court came to the conclusion that it had not.50 Hobhouse L.J. opined: 
 
‘The outcome of this evidence is that whatever results the plaintiff obtained in 1978 did not 
amount to evidence justifying a claim to have produced a recombinant DNA molecule which 
enabled the expression of HBsAg in E. coli (or any other host).’51 
 
Hobhouse L.J. ruled the description in the specification to be insufficient, holding that Claim 1 
of the patent referred to more than one invention (product).52 The court held that the 
                                                          
45  N. Jones ‘Biotechnology patents: a change of heart’  E.I.P.R. 1 (1994), 37; I. Judge, S. Cooke, M. 
Burdon, T. Powell, P. Gilbert and C. Hore. ‘Chiron v Organon and Biogen v Medeva: A Boost for the Biotech 
Industry’ Patent World, December 1993/January 1994, 20-26. 
46
  Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc [1995] RPC 25. The hearings at the Court of Appeal took place from 5-28 
July and on 27 October 1994; see also ‘Case Note’ [1994] 12 E.I.P.R. D316-D317. 
47
  Ibid., 68.  See also R.S. Crespi, 'Recombinant DNA patents in litigation - a comprehensive study of 
some EPO and UK national court decisions,' IIC 28 (1997), 603, 615, 
48  Ibid., 68-69. This was remarkable because, as noted recently by Lord Justice Lewison, ‘Appellate 
courts have been repeatedly warned, by recent cases at the highest level, not to interfere with findings of fact by 
trial judges, unless compelled to do so. This applies not only to findings of primary fact, but also to the 
evaluation of those facts and to inferences to be drawn from them’ - Fage UK Ltd & Another v Chobani UK Ltd 
& Another [2014] EWCA Civ 5 at para. 114. 
49
  Ibid., 70-76. See also May & Baker Ltd. v Boots [1950] UKHL 1 
50  Ibid., 111-112.  
51
  Ibid., 112. 
52  See I. Karet ‘Priority and Sufficiency, Inventions and Obviousness’ E.I.P.R. 1 (1995), 42, 45. 
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determination of sufficiency depended on the interaction between the description in the 
specification and the claim, with reference to the state of the art at the time of the application.53 - 
Here analysis of the specification and claim revealed that the 1978 Biogen 1 application did not 
adequately disclose the claimed invention(s).54 
 
Hobhouse L.J. further appeared to consider Prof. Murray’s strategy to be an obvious one. In this 
regard, he stated that the decision to adopt the strategy on the part of Murray/Biogen was purely 
a 'matter of business judgment', a 'mere commercial decision', and that all Biogen had done was 
'to pursue an identified goal by known means'.55 Moreover, even if the decision was not 'obvious' 
in a general sense, Hobhouse L.J. remarked that it was analogous to placing a bet on a horse 
based on the odds of success - 'an unobvious decision which is not an invention'.56 
 
Although this type of judicial thinking surprised some commentators,57 the fact is that Hobhouse 
L.J. remarked that he was inclined - and was only restrained by Medeva's counsel's lack of 
enthusiasm for the point - to rule that it was not an invention at all.58 As with the first instance 
decision, there was a direct impact on both companies' share prices, and Biogen appealed the 
Court of Appeal's ruling to the House of Lords, where the saga reached its conclusion.59  
 
(3) The end of the affair: Biogen v Medeva at the House of Lords  
 
As noted earlier, Biogen patented the recombinant method of making the antigens of a hepatitis 
B virus with a priority date of 22 December 1978 (the UK filing date - Biogen 1). It was accepted 
that it would have been obvious by 21 December 1979 (the EPO filing date for the Biogen 
patent). Therefore, the fundamental issue to be resolved by the House of Lords in Biogen v Medeva 
concerned the question of whether the claims of the patent, as granted by the EPO, were 
                                                          
53   Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc [1995] RPC 25. 78-83. 
54  Ibid. 78-82,  Exxon / Fuel oils OJEPO 1994, 653 (T 0409/91). 
55
  Ibid., 114. See also J. Thomson ‘The Grey Penumbra of Interpretation Surrounding the Obviousness 
Test for Biotech Patents’ E.I.P.R. 1 (1996), 90, 93. 
56  Ibid., 114. 
57  T. Cook ‘Patents and Novel Insights’ Managing Intellectual Property, February 1995, 3; J. M. 
Marshall ‘Biotechnology Patents: A Further Twist’ Patent World, February 1995, 25-28. 
58
  Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc [1995] RPC 25. 83. 
59
  N. Bannister, ‘Medeva stock boosted by vaccine patent victory’ The Guardian, 28 Oct 1994, 16. 
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supported by the previously filed UK patent application (Biogen 1) from which priority was 
claimed.60 The decision of the House of Lords was unanimous, with Lord Hoffmann delivering 
the major part of the judgment, dismissing the appeal, and maintaining that the claims of the 
Biogen patent were not supported by the earlier Biogen 1 application.61  Although it did not give 
an explicit opinion on the correct approach to obviousness,62 the decision acquired a landmark 
status in patent law because it affected the ways in which patent practice considered fundamental 
questions such as the meaning of the ‘invention’,63 and the date at which the sufficiency of a 
specification is to be judged.64  
 
Further to this, Biogen v Medeva ought to be viewed as a milestone case for patent scholarship 
because it enables the reader to reconsider many aspects of patent law. For one, it can be seen as 
a decision in which the institutional politics of patent law were laid bare - in particular, the case 
sheds light on the dissonance between the legal and scientific burdens of proof.65 In addition, 
although the House of Lords emphasised the position of authority and relevance of EPO 
decisions, it decided to revoke the very same patent that the EPO had previously upheld, 
showing once again that the multi-jurisdictional nature of European patent litigation can lead to 
disharmonious outcomes.66   
 
                                                          
60
  See R. Binns and B. Driscoll, ‘Biogen v. Medeva — the highest court in the UK delivers judgement’ Drug 
Discovery Today, 2(3), March 1997, 117-121; ‘Biogen and Medeva- the Ultimate Ruling’ Intellectual 
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  D. Brahams, ‘Biogen loses “landmark” vaccine patent claim’ The Lancet, 16 November 1996, 346(9038), 
1375. See also ‘Genetic engineering patent claim was too broad’ The Times, 1 November 1996,. 34; 
‘Medeva survives Hepagene challenge’ The Times, 1 November 1996, 34; R. Colbey ‘Patently Sensible’ 
The Guardian, 14 Nov 1996, B4.  
62
  See I. Karet, ‘Delivering the Goods? The House of Lords’ Decision in Biogen v Medeva,’ E.I.P.R. 1 
(1997), 21; 23; see also  A. White, C.I.P.A. Guide to the Patents Act (London: Sweet & Maxwell. 2001), 98.  
63
  The Hon Mr Justice Colin Birss, Andrew Waugh, QC, Tom Mitcheson, QC, Douglas Campbell, QC, 
Justin Turner, QC, Tom Hinchliffe, QC, Terrell on the Law of Patents (18th edition: London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2017), including at Chapter 2, section 2: ‘What is an Invention?’ (last accessed via Westlaw, 13 
December 2016).. 
64  Ibid., at Chapter 13, section 3: 'Biogen Insufficiency' (last acessed via Westlaw, 13 December 2016). 
65  'Case review: Biogen v Medeva, 20 years on,' Lifesciences Intellectual Property Review (2015) - 
http://www.lifesciencesipreview.com/article/case-review-biogen-v-medeva-20-years-on - see also A. Pottage 
and B. Sherman, Figures of Invention: A History of Modern Patent Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 1-29. 
66  For a commentary of these issues, see I. Karet, ‘English Courts and the EPO: What Next?,' Intellectual 
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D) READING LORD HOFFMAN’S JUDGMENT  
 
(1) Describing the Patent  
 
One of the remarkable aspects of the judgment is the clarity of Lord Hoffmann's prose. is.67 
Beginning in the first paragraph with a very short - but well written - passage on 'Genetic 
Engineering', Lord Hoffmann's neat and lucid description guides the reader through what DNA 
recombination is, and also covers how the subject of the patented invention - the HBV vaccine - 
works: 
 
‘The code is embodied in a molecule of deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") which directs the cell to 
make the proteins which the organism requires. Genetic engineering or 'recombinant DNA 
technology' consists of altering the DNA of a suitable cell so that it produces a protein which in 
nature occurs in another organism. In this way it has been possible to manufacture products of 
great medical importance which could not have been made by orthodox chemical synthesis.’68 
 
Going on to describe 'The Patent in suit' in paragraph 2 he stated: 
 
‘The principal claim of the patent in suit is for an artificially constructed molecule of DNA 
carrying a genetic code which, when introduced into a suitable host cell, will cause that cell to 
make antigens of the virus hepatitis B ('HBV').'69  
 
By comparison, the first time Simon Thorley Q.C. - an esteemed patent advocate, acting for the 
plaintiff (appellant) - described the invention in the list of his arguments (given at the beginning 
of the judgment as reported in the Reports of Patent, Design and Trade Mark Cases (RPC)) it 
comes across as over-technical: 
                                                          
67  Just a few months after the decision, some scholars already began using the term ‘landmark’ to 
describe the case - see M. Kern ‘Patentability of Biotechnological Inventions in the United Kingdom: The 
House of Lords Charts the Course’, IIC 29 (1998), 247-282, 248; D. Sternfeld ‘Biogen loses out in landmark 
UK biotech case’ Managing Intellectual Property, February 1997, 32-35. By contrast, see I.C. Baillie, ‘Biogen – 
Is it Possible to be Worse Than it Looks?’ CIPA Journal, February 1997, 146-147. 
68
  Biogen Inc v Medeva  plc [1997] RPC 1, 36. 
69
  Ibid., 32. 
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Lord Hoffmann further explained that these antigens can be used to test whether a patient is 
suffering from the virus - and, crucially, to make a vaccine. On this, it is worth remarking that as 
a non-scientist it is very difficult from reading the Court of Appeal judgment70 to fully 
understand what exactly the HBV does - or how it works - yet Lord Hoffmann described this in 
language suitable to the intricacy of the case and at the same time comprehensible to the non-
scientist reader.71+ The achievement is all the more impressive given that Lord Hoffmann was 
working with the obscurantist, scientific-legal language of patent law – a language that reflects 
the complexity that inevitably results from the coming together of the (perhaps incompatible) 
universes of law and science.72 
 
.  
 
(2) The issue of obviousness 
 
Beginning his assessment of inventive step, Lord Hoffmann emphasised that doing something 
first is not the same as being inventive, especially in a fast-developing area of science.73 
 
 
 
In terms of what Prof. Murray had actually done, Lord Hoffmann explained that he had purified 
DNA from Dane particles and had cut the DNA into fragments with restriction enzymes, with 
                                                          
70  Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc [1995] RPC 25, 68-72. 
71  A similar view has been expressed by Alan White - ‘Lord Hoffmann prefaces his judgment in the 
House of Lords with a very clear exposition of the fundamentals of biotechnology and genetic engineering. His 
judgment is worth reading solely as a primer to this arcana area of modern science’ in A.W. White ‘House of 
Lords Disapproves of Free Beer’ CIPA Journal, December 1996, 1020-1028, 1023.   
72
 A. Pottage and B. Sherman, Figures of Invention: A History of Modern Patent Law (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 181-206. 
73
  Biogen Inc v Medeva  plc [1997] RPC 1, 33-34. 
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the aim of producing large fragments containing the relevant gene (which would make it easier to 
experiment on the fragments later on).74 Lord Hoffmann went on to say: 
 
 'By the time of the EPO patent application, the claims make it clear that they cover not only the 
polypeptide but also fragments which exhibit the relevant properties. But Biogen 1 does not 
make anything of this point.’75 (emphasis added) 
 
Early on, and without yet exploring the issue fully, Lord Hoffmann was already signalling that he 
considered the Biogen 1 application to be somewhat deficient - in fact, insufficient.76 However, 
before examining this further he turned to the specifics of the Biogen patent's claims, noting  
that what was claimed was 'a product, a molecule identified partly by the way in which it has 
been made (“recombinant DNA”) and partly by what it does'.77  In this respect the patent 
claimed a broad monopoly over 'any recombinant DNA molecule which expressed the genes of 
any HBV antigen in any host cell' and for 'any method of making a DNA molecule which would 
achieve the necessary expression' (emphasis added).78 
 
 
 
As we shall see, the claim to any method would prove to be of great significance to the question 
of whether the claims properly supported the invention. But before addressing that question, 
Lord Hoffmann put forward a number of important points about the interpretation of 
'invention' under s.1(1) of the Patents Act 1977. Regarding the question of 'what is an invention?' 
as separate from the four key requirements of patentability - which had been a crucial issue in 
Genentech79 - he stated that the four requirements probably covered every possible meaning of 
invention and that the separate question should not be a primary focus, and should only be 
contemplated if analysis of the four requirements has left some ambiguity as to the nature of the 
                                                          
74
  Ibid., 39. 
75
  Ibid., 39. 
76  Ibid., 39. 
77
  Ibid., 40. 
78
  Ibid., 40. 
79
  Genentech Inc.'s Patent [1989] RPC 147. 
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invention at hand (leaving open the possibility, however remote, that there could be issues of 
'invention' separate  to the four requirements).80 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, one considerable virtue of Lord Hoffmann's ruling is the removal of the awkward 
requirement from Genentech that a judge had to consider whether the patent covered an 
'invention' before he/she analysed the various categories of novelty, inventive step, industrial 
application etc.81  
 
 
 
Having dealt with the somewhat pedantic question of 'what is an invention?' as removed from 
analysis of the key requirements of an invention, Lord Hoffmann moved on to explain his 
consideration of one of the critical issues at hand: whether Prof. Murray had performed an 
inventive step.82 He expressed his dissatisfaction with the conclusions reached by Aldous J. at the 
Patents Court, arguing that Aldous J. had taken an over-broad approach to defining the inventive 
concept as the mere idea of making HBV antigens by recombinant DNA technology.83 
 
’ Rather than putting it so broadly, Lord Hoffmann remarked that the inventive concept in the 
present case ought to be described as 'the notion that Professor Murray's method of achieving 
the goal - creating large fragments of genomic DNA, ligating them to pBR322 and introducing 
the hybrid molecule into E. coli - would work’.84  
 
In other words, it was the operative part of the invention that Aldous J. had missed. Yet, 
although he was not satisfied by Aldous J.'s assessment, it is notable that Lord Hoffmann also 
                                                          
80
  Biogen Inc v Medeva  plc [1997] RPC 1, 41. 
81
  Genentech Inc.'s Patent [1989] RPC 147, 264. 
82  Biogen Inc v Medeva  plc [1997] RPC 1, 42-43. 
83
  Ibid., 43. 
84
  Ibid., 43. 
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heavily criticised elements of the approach taken by the Court of Appeal - specifically the appeal 
court's reference to the fact that Biogen had made an initial decision, based on commercial 
concerns, to 'pursue an identified goal by known means'.85 Nor did he find the 'placing a bet' 
analogy useful.86 For Lord Hoffmann, the company's commercial decision-making process was 
simply not relevant to the question of patentability: 
 
’The fact that a given experimental strategy was adopted for commercial reasons, because the 
anticipated rewards seemed to justify the necessary expenditure, is no reason why that strategy 
should not involve an inventive step. An inventor need not pursue his experiments untouched 
by thoughts of gain. Most patents are the result of research programmes undertaken on the basis 
of hard-headed cost-benefit analysis’.87 
 
However, he was in general agreement with the approach taken by Hobhouse L.J. to the 
patentability question – that the strategy of Prof. Murray was to pursue an identified goal by 
known means  even though he deepened the analysis in his characteristic style: 
 
'A proper statement of the inventive concept needs to include some express or implied reference 
to the problem which it required invention to overcome. The reasons why the expert witnesses 
thought it was not obvious to try the expression of genomic HBV DNA in E. coli were for the 
most part concerned with the uncertainties, in the absence of sequence information, about the 
presence of the HBV antigen genes in the Dane particle DNA, the perceived difficulties of 
expressing genomic eukaryotic DNA in a prokaryotic host, and, specifically, the problem of 
introns. It seems to me, therefore, that a more accurate way of stating the inventive concept as it 
appeared to Aldous J. is to say that it was the idea of trying to express unsequenced eukaryotic 
DNA in a prokaryotic host’.88 
 
Thus, Lord Hoffmann not only identified the bare bones of the inventive concept - as it had 
appeared to Aldous J. - he also fleshed it out, describing its operative elements with typical 
                                                          
85
  Ibid., 44. 
86  Ibid., 44. 
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  Ibid. 
88
  Ibid., 44-45. 
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clarity, and making reference to the usefulness of the scientific expert witness testimony.89 
Indeed, Lord Hoffmann was satisfied with the assumption that what Prof. Murray did was not 
obvious, and was, therefore, inventive. In this, although he neatly  sidestepped both prior 
judgments, he ended up much closer to Aldous J.'s view on obviousness than that of Hobhouse 
L.J. 
 
 Lord Hoffmann summed up his view by saying that the patent's inventiveness was 'of a very 
unusual kind'   because it involved trying something 'which a man less skilled in the art might 
have regarded as obvious, but which the expert would have thought so beset by obstacles as not 
to be worth trying'.90 
 
What makes Lord Hoffman's judgment a landmark on the point of inventiveness is therefore 
twofold: first, we know from the judgment that analysing the four patenteability requirements 
will comprehensively deal with the question of 'what is an invention?' in the vast majority of 
cases, and there is no need for a separate Genentech-style assessment; and second, Lord Hoffmann 
provided detailed guidance to patent assessors and judges regarding how they should apply the 
Windsurfing test to biotechnological inventions, emphasising the importance of expert testimony 
regarding the person skilled in the art.91 
 
 
. 
 
(3) Support and 'Biogen Insufficiency' 
 
Key to Lord Hoffmann's ultimate decision on the patent's validity was his consideration of the 
question of whether the Biogen 1 application (from December 1978) supported the invention 
claimed in the Biogen patent (filed December 1979). On this point Lord Hoffman emphasised 
that 'the specification must enable the invention to be performed to the full extent of the 
                                                          
89  Ibid., 44-45. 
90  Ibid. 46. 
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  Ibid., 43-48. Windsurfing International Inc v. Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd [1985] RPC 59 and 
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monopoly claimed'.92 Lord Hoffmann further opined that in a case where the claims include a 
number of products, the patent must enable the invention 'to be performed in respect of each of 
them'.93 Crucial here was analysing whether (i) the patent described a product which has a 
beneficial effect, but nonetheless did not demonstrate a common principle corresponding to 
other products which will share the beneficial effects (products of the same class), or (ii) whether 
the patent disclosed a 'beneficial property which is common to the class' of products.94 In the 
former case, the patentee would only be entitled to a patent for the single described product – 
but with the latter the patentee could claim a monopoly on all products of the class.95 
 
 
 
Here Lord Hoffmann also explained that a patent be over-broad if it claims 'every way of 
achieving a result when it enables only one way and it is possible to envisage other ways of 
achieving that result which make no use of the invention’.96  
s  
 
Finally, he examined the Biogen 1 on the question of support: 
 
‘As I have said, I accept the judge's findings that the method was shown to be capable of making 
both antigens and I am willing to accept that it would work in any otherwise suitable host cell. 
Does this contribution justify a claim to a monopoly of any recombinant method of 
making the antigens? In my view it does not. The claimed invention is too broad. Its 
excessive breadth is due, not to the inability of the teaching to produce all the promised 
results, but to the fact that the same results could be produced by different means.'97 
(emphasis added) 
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  Ibid., 48. See also Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK's Application [1991] RPC 485. 
93  Ibid. 49. 
94  Ibid., 49. 
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Here Lord Hoffmann referred to the fact that, although Prof. Murray had done something 
brilliant 'in cutting through the uncertainties' of the day to achieve a positive result, he did not 
actually 'establish any new principle which his successors had to follow if they were to achieve 
the same results'.98 Specifically, despite the fact that Prof. Murray had in the patent, described a 
way of choosing restriction enzymes that would cleave the DNA of the Dane particle into large 
fragments, once the DNA had been sequenced there was no need to choose to follow Prof. 
Murray's method – scientists could instead choose 'those which digested the sites closest to the 
relevant gene or the part of the gene which expressed an antigenic fragment of the polypeptide'.99 
.  
 
As Lord Hoffmann put it: 
 
'The metaphor used by one of the witnesses was that before the genome had been sequenced 
everyone was working in the dark. Professor Murray invented a way of working with the genome 
in the dark. But he did not switch on the light and once the light was on his method was no 
longer needed.'100   
 
Lord Hoffmann went on to express his concerns about awarding too wide a monopoly to a 
single inventor, emphasising that although Prof. Murray had led the way, other researchers could 
follow what he had done by different routes – and he did not consider that simply leading the 
way was 'enough to justify a monopoly of the whole field'.101 On this, Lord Hoffmann further 
remarked: 
 
'The technical contribution made in such cases deserves to be recognised. But care is needed 
not to stifle further research and healthy competition by allowing the first person who 
has found a way of achieving an obviously desirable goal to monopolise every other way 
of doing so‘.102 (emphasis added) 
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Therefore, Lord Hoffmann held that the Biogen 1 application did not support the invention as 
claimed in the later filed European Patent, and for this reason it could not claim the priority date 
of Biogen 1. Moreover, because it had already been conceded that the invention was obvious 
when the Biogen patent  was filed at the EPO in 1979, the patent was deemed to be invalid.103 
 
While Lord Hoffmann accepted that the patent, lacking the support of the earlier priority date, 
was obvious, and thus invalid, he considered that his reasoning in making this decision meant 
that it was necessary to discuss what would become known as the landmark principle of (Biogen) 
insufficiency: 
 
'In other words, the application may not add new matter to make an insufficient application 
sufficient. It seems to me in accordance with this scheme that an insufficient application should 
also not become sufficient because of general developments in the state of the art after the filing 
date'.104  
 
‘ 
 
 
 
In the view of Lord Hoffman, Claim 1 of the Biogen patent (a product) generalised the teachings 
of the Biogen 1 application.105 It did so because the Biogen 1 application referred to a particular 
form of a product.; yet, Claim 1 of the patent referred to any form of the product. In addition, 
Lord Hoffmann held that the method which was used was also generalised - in the Biogen 1 
application, the particular product was made from a particular process. However, the patent's 
claims as granted covered any method of making any form of the product.. For this reason Lord 
Hoffmann ruled that the technical contribution disclosed in the Biogen 1 application did not 
correspond to the broad monopoly sought by Claim 1 of the Biogen patent i.e. the Biogen 
patent's claims lacked sufficient support from the Biogen 1 application.106 Thus the claim was 
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held to be not fully enabled by the specification - the only thing that could be validly claimed was 
the production of the antigen by the particular means disclosed. The overall principle of Biogen 
insufficiency can therefore be described as follows: the patent's claims must be supported by the 
description of the invention - as contained in the patent specification - or else the patent will be 
held invalid for insufficiency.107  
 
As with the earlier decisions, the House of Lords' ruling had an immediate impact on 
the companies' share prices, with the value of Biogen falling by just over 4% and 
Medeva's showing a small rise.108 
 
(4) Reconciling Lord Hoffmann's view with the EPO's decisions 
 
Having declared the patent invalid, Lord Hoffman had to explain how he could reconcile this 
decision with the EPO Technical Board's earlier decision that the patent was, in fact, valid.109 
Lord Hoffmann did this in a particularly elegant way, noting that the decision of the EPO in that 
decision did not actually proceed on any principle different from those he endeavoured to 
apply.110 He noted that, like him, the Technical Board had decided that the invention in Biogen 1 
was not obvious – however, the Technical Board had held that the disclosure in Biogen 1 
corresponded to the same invention claimed in the patent, and that the patent's disclosure was 
sufficient to 'enable the invention to be performed to the full extent of the claims'.111 Here, Lord 
Hoffmann's view diverged from that of the Technical Board – according to Lord Hoffmann the 
Technical Board had failed to assess 'whether the claims were too broad because expression 
could also be achieved without the use of the teaching which it contained'.112 
 
                                                          
107  Ibid. 54.  
108  'Medeva Wins in Court Battle With Biogen' The New York Times, 1 November, 1996. 
109
  See also Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc v H N Norton & Co Ltd [1996] RPC 76. 
110  The Court of Appeal decision had been criticised for not engaging with EPO case law - see B.C. Reid, 
‘Biogen in the EPO: The Advantage of Scientific Understanding,’  E.I.P.R. 2 (1995), 98 and C. Colston, 
‘Genetic Engineering – Failure to Invent? The House of Lords’ decision in Biogen Inc v. Medeva plc,’  
Intellectual Property Quarterly (1997), 521. 
111
  Biogen Inc v Medeva  plc [1997] RPC 1, 53. 
112
  Ibid., 53. 
23 
 
In  making this argument Lord Hoffmann explicitly referred to two key EPO decisions in 
Genentech113 and Exxon:114 
 
 'But the principle upon which I have come to the conclusion that on this ground the patent is 
invalid is also, as I have said, clearly stated in decisions of the EPO such as Genentech I and 
Exxon. I would not therefore regard the outcome of this appeal as suggesting any divergence 
between the jurisprudence of this court and that of the EPO’.115 
 
Rather than ignoring the EPO Technical Board, as the Court of Appeal had done, Lord 
Hoffmann cleverly integrated its reasoning in the earlier cases of Genentech and Exxon in order to 
come to a conclusion that differed from the EPO's Biogen decision, but which nonetheless 
fulfilled the expectation that national courts should take into account EPO decisions when 
national litigation takes place over a European Patent.116 
 
(5) Biogen Insufficiency Reconsidered   
 
Late in his judicial career, Lord Hoffmann was given the opportunity - more than a decade after 
Biogen - to reconsider his earlier ruling. From the bench of the Court of Appeal, Lord Hoffman 
gave the judgment in Lundbeck v Generics (UK) Ltd.117 Here, he severely narrowed the scope of his 
own doctrine of Biogen insufficiency - effectively distinguishing it on its own facts.  
 
In Biogen v Medeva, Lord Hoffman had ruled that it was insufficient for a patentee to merely 
disclose one way of performing the invention. In other words, if it was 'possible to envisage 
other ways of achieving [its result] which make no use of the invention' the patent would be 
invalid for being 'wide or speculative'.118 Overall, his view had been that the patent monopoly 
must correspond exactly with the claims of the invention. In this, Lord Hoffmann emphasised 
the need to allow subsequent research and to ensure competition between scientific bodies. 
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What led to criticism of the judgment - and eventually to Lord Hoffmann's own decision in 
Generics v Lundbeck to drastically reduce the scope of Biogen insufficiency - was a realisation that 
the UK Patents Act, following the EPC, requires protecting patents for products 'as such'.119 In 
this respect, two things became increasingly clear in the aftermath of Biogen: (i) in the case of a 
product patent it is inevitable that the monopoly conferred will include all ways of making and 
using the product - otherwise it would not truly be a product patent;120 and (ii) when preparing, 
writing and filing the patent application, the teaching disclosed in the claims of the patent cannot 
conceivably cover every single way of making/using the product.  
 
Thus, a clear conflict was visible between what the law said should be protectable, and what 
Lord Hoffmann in Biogen v Medeva considered ought to be covered by the scope of the patent's 
claims. In Generics v Lundbeck, Lord Hoffmann acknowledged this and recast his earlier ruling in 
light of this: 
 
‘Parliament has chosen to allow product claims and the jurisprudence of the EPO, which we 
have always regarded as carrying great weight, shows that such claims can be made in the latter 
case as well. It is too late to have regrets about the breadth of the monopoly which such claims 
confer’.121 
 
Despite it being 'too late', it is clear from the above that even as when reconsidering his own 
earlier ruling, Lord Hoffmann could not quite shrug off a lingering regret about the legislative 
breadth of the patent monopoly  and its consequent effects on competition. 
 
 
D. THE LEGACY OF THE CASE: THE PARTICIPANTS’ PERSPECTIVE  
 
In February 2015 several of those involved in the initial Patents Court trial in Biogen v Medeva 
participated in a discussion panel in central London organised by a leading intellectual property 
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solicitors firm (Rouse).122 Although the spokeswoman for Medeva and the chief-executive of 
Biogen had already expressed their views immediately after the decision  was handed over by the 
Lords,123 it is nevertheless interesting to consider how the participants viewed the saga of the 
case almost twenty years after it was concluded, particularly since several fascinating points were 
raised that are not contained within the public records of the case.124  
 
One of these aspects relates to the cultural gap between US lawyers and British barristers. 
Andrew Waugh Q.C., who had participated as a junior counsel for Biogen, recalled that during 
the initial Patents Court trial - where Hugh Laddie Q.C. (later to become Sir Hugh Laddie) had 
taken the lead in arguing the case for Biogen - the tension level between Biogen's different sets 
of transatlantic lawyers was often very high. For him, the most traumatic incident occurred one 
morning just before the trial was about to recommence, when a 'momentous row' erupted 
outside the courtroom between Laddie and Jim Haley, a US attorney working for Biogen, 
concerning the sharing of cross-examination notes.125 Suffice to say, Waugh felt the public nature 
of the argument was damaging to morale on the Biogen side and gave a boost to the other side 
(Medeva). 
 
Another aspect that nobody who participated in the trial could possibly forget was the difficulties 
involved in analysing and weighing up the value of complex scientific evidence in the legal 
context : specifically,  was a hepatitis B surface antigen expressed by doing what the patent 
described?126 In this regard, Prof. Jeffrey Almond – who was then working as a Professor of 
Microbiology at the University of Reading who testified for Medeva - had cast doubt on the 
reliability of the autoradiographs that Biogen had presented as evidence (demonstrating the 
expression of the hepatitis B surface antigen). Here, Hugh Laddie Q.C. for Biogen had focused 
the court's attention on a number of highlighted dark areas in the autoradiographs which 
apparently showed where the radioactive label had been bound to the apparently expressed 
                                                          
122
  'Case review: Biogen v Medeva, 20 years on,' Lifesciences Intellectual Property Review (2015) - 
http://www.lifesciencesipreview.com/article/case-review-biogen-v-medeva-20-years-on 
123  M. Grimond, ‘Medeva wins court case’ The Independent, 1 November 1996,26;  
124
  'Case review: Biogen v Medeva, 20 years on,' Lifesciences Intellectual Property Review (2015) - 
http://www.lifesciencesipreview.com/article/case-review-biogen-v-medeva-20-years-on 
125
  Ibid. 
126
  Biogen relied on the testimony of Professor Sir Kenneth Murray, Professor Burrell, Professor Villa-
Komaroff, Dr. Alan Kingsman. Medeva called Professor Jeffrey Almond, Dr. Cozens and Mr. Ronald Holmes 
as witnesses. 
26 
 
surface antigen. Yet, to the naked eye these dark areas looked like mere black smudges. Thus 
during Prof. Almond's testimony, Peter Prescott Q.C. for Medeva had belittled the 
autoradiographs as mere 'smudgeograms'.127    
 
Prof. Almond also recalled that he had found assessing this surface antigen expression question 
as an expert at a legal trial a strange experience: as a scientist, he had been trained to be wary of 
making conclusions based on partial evidence; yet at the trial his duty was to give his conclusive 
analysis - that he was unconvinced that the surface antigen expression had occurred - without the 
benefit of pressing for further scientific tests.128 Ultimately, Prof. Almond came away from the 
trial with a profound understanding of how dissimilar the fields of law and science are from a 
methodological point of view, with each field possessing its own rational processes and own 
standards of acceptable proof.129 Of course, Prof. Almond is certainly not the first person to 
have made this point; in fact, as noted earlier, it is this dissonance makes patent law a particularly 
fascinating area, and a hugely challenging one.130 
 
Despite the lack of harmony between the fields of law and science, the Biogen case makes clear 
just how important expert testimony is in patent litigation – put simply, the only way the Patents 
Court, Court of Appeal and House of Lords could make sense of the legal issues was to rely on 
the views of scientific experts about the art of biotechnology.131   
 
Furthermore, despite being an outsider to the law, Prof. Almond remembered how quickly he 
had become gripped by the drama of the courtroom. In particular, he came to realise that in the 
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litigation arena even a casual remark exchanged between experts on opposing sides might have 
serious consequences.132 Before testifying, Prof. Alan Kingsman - the main scientific expert for 
Biogen, who later went on to found his own biotech company, Oxford BioMedica - had 
remarked in a relaxed conversation with his erstwhile professional acquaintance and fellow 
expert, Prof Almond (perhaps naively, since Almond was due to testify for Medeva), that much 
of his scientific report had been co-authored by Biogen's legal team.133 Almond reported this 
comment back to his own legal team (Medeva) - and at the cross-examination Peter Prescott 
Q.C. did not hesitate to use it as a weapon, quietly but stealthily putting Kingsman 'under the 
cosh' by asking whether a key passage of the report was Kingsman's own testimony or 
'something a lawyer has written for you'.134 A flustered Kingsman had immediately shot a cold 
dagger look across at Almond - one Almond has never been able to put out of his mind.135 
 
Interestingly, later in the trial, when it was Prof. Almond's turn to be cross-examined, he faced 
his own difficult moment on the stand: Hugh Laddie Q.C. unexpectedly dug out Almond's CV 
from a bundle of papers and asked him why, since he claimed to be an expert in the DNA field 
in the late 1970s, his own CV showed that he had attended an entry-level course on the subject 
during the period that Prof. Murray was conducting the experiments that led to the 1978 Biogen 
1 application.136 Prof. Almond noted that the 'CV ambush' experience, like Kingsman's cold 
dagger look, is something he has never forgotten.137 
 
Finally, Andrew Waugh Q.C. made a significant retrospective point about the law: in Biogen the 
initial trial verdict was overturned on appeal - a situation identical to all of the subsequent 
landmark biotechnology cases (Kirin-Amgen v TKT,138 Conor v Angiotech,139 Generics v Lundbeck,140 
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and Human Genome Sciences v Eli Lilly141) breaking the initial pattern established by Genentech,142 
where the initial trial verdict was upheld. As a result, Waugh quipped that in complex biotech 
cases he had learned a valuable lesson:  
 
’Where the law is new and the facts are difficult, lose at first instance: the prospects of winning 
on appeal are much better’.143 
 
This comment reflects two central concerns that illustrate why Biogen is a milestone case: first, 
accommodating biotechnological inventions within patent law required something 'new' 
conceptually (in terms of expanding the notion of the 'invention' to allow organisms to be seen 
as 'manufactured', and thus, 'invented'); and second, it required a reliance on technology and 
scientific expertise (for assessing what the 'difficult' facts were concerning the new 'intellectual 
possessions').144  That all the key subsequent UK biotech patent cases have been overturned on 
appeal may demonstrate that the participants and arbiters of the legal process – lawyers and 
judges – require time, and perhaps the benefit of distance from the initial trial, to fully process  
the profound changes that happen when a new field of science comes to law. Biogen v Medeva is 
certainly one case that reflects this, and it ought to be seen as a true landmark. 
 
 
 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
 
Even 20 years on, reading though the Biogen v Medeva judgments - at the Patents Court, Court of 
Appeal and House of Lords levels - is a rich experience for the patent lawyer. In particular, Lord 
Hoffmann's judgment in the House of Lords guides us vividly through several of the key 
questions at the heart of patent law: what does obviousness mean? What happens when 
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avowedly commercial strategies lead to scientific inventiveness? Who is the person skilled in the 
art? What does sufficiency of disclosure mean? How can UK litigation and EPO rulings be 
reconciled? What are the consequences of patent monopolies on scientific competition? How 
should patent law respond to new forms of scientific innovation? These are recurring questions 
in patent jurisprudence, and they are unlikely to ever be solved definitively; but there is little 
doubt that in Biogen Lord Hoffmann gives as lucid an explanation of them as any ever set down 
in law, rivalling the US Supreme Court decision of Diamond v Chakrabarty.145  
 
Moreover, tracing the legacy of Lord Hoffmann's statement on 'Biogen insufficiency' - from the 
earlier decision in Genentech to the subsequent case of Generics v Lundbeck - gives the scholar of 
patent law much food for thought, particularly concerning the political and legislative context 
that sometimes leads judges to revise their earlier opinions.146 Indeed, Biogen reminds us of the 
sheer complexity of biotechnology cases as an area where the law has often had to grapple with 
apparently unprecedented leaps in scientific knowledge, and where appeals and reversals are not 
only not uncommon: they are the  
norm.147   
 
Ultimately, the analysis given over the course of this chapter shows that this landmark case still has 
much to teach us, not least about how dissimilar the areas of law and science are from a 
methodological point of view, with each field possessing its own rational processes and own standards 
of acceptable proof.148 On this, one can say that Biogen v Medeva  provides firm evidence – to scholars 
of science and law alike - that it is precisely this dissonance that makes patent law both a fascinating 
area and a hugely challenging one. The complexity involved in the analysis of patent law in 
biotech cases may demonstrate that the participants and arbiters of the legal process – lawyers 
and judges – require time, and perhaps the benefit of distance from the initial trial, to fully 
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process  the profound changes that happen when a new field of science comes to law, and 
demands adjudication.149 
 
 
 
 
. 
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